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THE AUTHORITY TO BRING
PRIVATE TREBLE-DAMAGE SUITS
UNDER "RICO" SHOULD BE REFORMED
This memorandum details some of the serious problems
that have arisen with the authorisation for private treble

damage suits under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ

izations ("RICO") title of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.

It explains why reform of

those provisions is necessary now, and why the amendment of
the private civil action section to establish a prior-criminal

conviction requirement is the best solution available.
I.

INTRODUCTION
With little discussion, the House of Representatives

in 1970 added the provision for private civil suits to a

Senate-passed bill that was primarily designed to give the

Department of Justice new criminal enforcement tools to attack
"the mob."

The Senate had drafted a bill with broad language

in order to give the Justice Department adequate latitude in

prosecuting persistent offenders, even if they were not members
of traditional criminal syndicates.

It was expected, however,

that the Justice Department, in exercising its enforcement
discretion, would be faithful to the expressed congressional
purpose to direct the new criminal sanctions against "organized
crime," as experienced prosecutors understand that term.

The

Justice Department, in fact, has adopted formal guidelines to
avoid abusive or excessive use of the broad language of RICO,

and has exercised discretion in selecting cases for prosecution
under RICO.

See pp. 46-50, infra.

The provision for private civil suits was added very
late in the legislative process and was intended to have the
same focus:

protecting legitimate businesses from incursions

by professional criminals.

Congress neglected, however, to

include any specific mechanism to confine private civil suits

to cases involving the activities of "organized crime.”

Private claimants invoking the broadly phrased
statute have not shown any of the discipline exercised by

the Justice Department in its selective use of this powerful

new weapon.

As a result, inventive private lawyers seeking

treble damages are successfully arguing for the most sweeping

interpretation of RICO's broad language and are attempting

to apply RICO in contexts far removed from those conceived
by the statute's supporters.

RICO claims are now added as a

matter of course in virtually all cases challenging securities

transactions or alleging some type of commercial fraud.

RICO

also crops up in landlord-tenant and real estate disputes,
attorney-client conflicts, and even divorce battles.

By

contrast, only a tiny handful of the hundreds of cases alleg

ing private civil claims under RICO involve either the people
or the conduct that supporters of the bill sought to attack.

Without any of the restraint and responsibility

that governs the decisions of public prosecutors, private
lawyers are invoking civil RICO on behalf of private clients
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to level charges of "racketeering" against reputable business
men and professionals such as investment bankers, brokers, and
accountants.

Although RICO was intended to protect legitimate

business, the statute is now being used almost exclusively to

attack established businesses and firms.

The threat to bring

a "racketeering” charge sometimes coerces settlements before
the filing of a RICO complaint, while the actual filing of a
RICO complaint exposes businessmen to continuing embarrassment
and expense.

The Supreme Court has now held that the courts do
not have the authority to stop the misuse of civil RICO, and

that only Congress may do so;

In its recent decision in

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., ___ U.S. ___ , 53 U.S.L.W. 5034
(July 1, 1985) ("Sedima"), the Court unanimously recognized

that RICO is being used in ways unintended by Congress, as a

weapon against legitimate businessmen in ordinary commercial
disputes.

A bare majority of the Court, however, held that

this unfortunate result "is inherent in the statute as written,

and its correction must lie with Congress."

5039.

53 U.S.L.W. at

Thus, the unintended targets of RICO actions have

little or no hope of relief from the courts.

The misuse

repeatedly noted by commentators and courts alike, including
now the United States Supreme Court, can only be eliminated

by congressional action.
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RICO STATUTE PERMITS
OVERLY BROAD USE BY PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
The private civil RICO section is 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Under that provision, a person may press a civil RICO claim if

he alleges that he was "injured in his business or property by
reason of" the defendant's "pattern of racketeering activity."

The plaintiff may recover treble damages as well as costs and
attorney's fees.

The private civil claim under RICO involves

three main components.

A.

Predicate Offenses:
"Racketeering Activity"

Congress doubted that it could adequately define

"organized crime" in a criminal statute in a way that would
pass constitutional muster.

It chose instead to focus on

the types of conduct in which organized crime figures engage.

The key to RICO coverage is an extensive list of "predicate"
offenses that are defined as constituting "racketeering activ

ity."

18 U.S.C. S 1961.

These include a variety of violent

crimes, such as murder, kidnapping, extortion, and arson —
crimes that one normally associates with organized crime.

In

addition, because of some indications from the SEC staff that
organized crime figures were involved in trafficking in stolen
or counterfeit securities and similar kinds of activity, the
SEC asked the Senate to expand the list of predicate offenses

in its bill to include mail fraud, wire fraud, and "fraud in

the sale of securities."

See p. 30, infra.
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B.

"Pattern" of Racketeering Activity

The commission of at least two predicate acts within
a ten year period is defined to be a "pattern" of racketeering

activity.

The initial step in a plaintiff's civil RICO claim

is to assert that a "person" — including the whole spectrum

of legitimate business corporations, associations, partner
ships, and their executives — committed two predicate acts

within ten years and thus engaged in a "pattern of racketeer
ing activity."
Unfortunately, this sweeping coverage makes virtually

any businessman or business organization a potential target of
a RICO claim.

Since the two predicate offenses may not need

to be separated in time or involve different transactions, a
claimant may allege that a single commercial transaction that

generates a dispute constitutes a "pattern of racketeering."
For example, an investor may allege simply that a securities
transaction consisting of two steps involved fraud.

This

allegation may make out a "pattern of racketeering activity"

involving "fraud in the sale of securities."

Similarly, a

would-be RICO plaintiff may assert that two separate copies of

a financial statement, bill, contract, advertisement or other

document involved in an allegedly "fraudulent" transaction
were sent through the mails.

As Justice Marshall, writing for

four Justices of the Supreme Court in the Sedima case, recog

nized, "the effects of making a mere two instances of mail or

5

wire fraud potentially actionable under civil RICO are stagger

ing

53 U.S.L.W. at 5040, because of the breadth of those

statutory provisions.
C.

"Enterprise" Requirement

RICO also requires that the person commit the predi
cate acts in a particular relationship to an "enterprise.”
Under the statute, it is unlawful to obtain any interest in

an "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering activity,
to control an enterprise through such activity, or to conduct
the affairs of an enterprise through racketeering activity.

18 U.S.C. § 1962.

Depending on the facts, a plaintiff can

easily satisfy the "enterprise" requirement in actions against
legitimate businesses or businessmen by alleging that, for

example, the defendant corporation or professional partnership

is the "enterprise" that is conducting its affairs improperly.

III. THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL
"RICO" SHOWS A PURPOSE TO PROTECT
LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES
The bill that became the 1970 Organized Crime Control

Act, including the RICO title, originated in the Senate.

The

Senate report stated unambiguously the objective of the legis

lation :
"[T]he eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools
in the evidence-gathering process, by establish
ing new penal prohibitions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those engaged
in organized crime." S. Rep. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) (emphasis added).
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In this vein. Senator McClellan, the bill's chief
sponsor and a longtime foe of organised crime, focused his
arguments for the bill on the Insidious activities of "La Cosa

Nostra."

116 Cong. Rec. 585-86 (1970).

In particular, his

sponsorship reflected awareness that, when "organized crime
moves into a business, it usually brings to that venture all

the techniques of violence and intimidation which it used in
its illegal businesses."

115 Cong. Rec. 5874 (1969).

The

Senate wanted to provide a mechanism to respond to reports

that "organized crime has begun to penetrate* some legitimate

businesses, such as securities firms from which it was steal
ing securities.

See S. Rep. No. 617, supra, at 77; 116 Cong.

Rec. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).

The House shared this concern about the infiltration

of organized crime into businesses across the nation.

Thus,

when Congressman Poff, a leading proponent of the legislation,
pointed to the takeover of a jukebox business by "a mafia

boss," he illustrated the general understanding that RICO was
meant to protect legitimate business people injured by organized

crime.

116 Cong. Rec. 6709 (1970).
The Senate RICO bill had contained no provision for

private civil suits when Senator McClellan introduced it, when
the Judiciary Committee added the fraud predicates, or when
the Senate initially passed the bill.

A private civil remedy

finally was added to the RICO legislation in the House Judi

ciary Committee at the urging of Representative Steiger, who
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submitted the drift of the language that ultimately became
law.

In submitting the amendment. Representative Steiger

explained that his proposal was designed to add a private

remedy to help in the fight "to deal with organized crime."
Organized Crime Control:

Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5

of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 30 and Related Propo

sals Relating to the Control of Organized Crime in the United
States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 519 (1970).

He carefully empha

sized his understanding that RICO was designed "to prevent
and reverse the corrupt infiltration of legitimate commercial

activities by ruthless organized criminals."

Id.

So as to

leave no room to doubt that he expected that the new statute,

including his civil damage remedy, would be directed against

"ruthless, organized criminals," Representative Steiger
described examples of penetration of legitimate businesses by
various "families" of "La Cosa Nostra" — the Mafia.

Id.

In

the sparse debate on the civil damage provision when the bill

reached the House floor, the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, Representative Celler, explained that the addition
of a treble-damage remedy was to be one of the tools "designed

to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate business by organized
crime."

116 Cong. Rec. 35,196 (1970).

The bill returned to the Senate shortly before
adjournment, and the Senate accepted the amended version
without seeking a conference.

In doing so, however, no

one suggested that the focus of congressional concern —
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protection of legitimate businessmen — had shifted in the

slightest.

Indeed, Senator McClellan described the House

amendments, including the addition of the civil provision,

as "comparatively . . . minor changes.”
(1970).

116 Cong. Rec. 36,293

At no time did any supporter of the bill suggest that

the private civil remedy was intended for use against legiti

mate business people, corporations, or partnerships of licensed
professionals, or was to be used in commercial disputes having

nothing whatever to do with the activities that were and are
commonly recognized as "organized crime."
IV. THE USE OF THE PRIVATE CIVIL DAMAGE
PROVISION HAS ACTUALLY UNDERMINED
THE CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIVE
In light of the unambiguous congressional focus,

civil RICO actions should closely parallel criminal prosecu
tions.

Instead, civil RICO is used almost exclusively in

commercial disputes, against what Assistant Attorney General

Stephen S. Trott, in testifying on RICO before this Committee
on May 20, 1985, called "conduct bearing little resemblence

to organized crime activity in the traditional sense."

The

statute is now being invoked in every kind of litigation where
a litigant can possibly allege the predicate offense of "fraud".
Virtually all of these claims are either covered by specific

federal regulatory laws such as the securities laws or do not

belong in the federal courts at all.

In the vast majority of

cases, civil RICO claims are being used as weapons against
the very people Congress was seeking to protect:
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legitimate

business people.

Not only have these developments distorted

congressional expectations, but they also present widely recog

nized and increasing opportunities for abuse.
A.

The Ability Of A Private Lawyer
To Charge A Person With Criminal
"Racketeering" Is Easily Abused

RICO is unprecedented in authorizing private lawyers

who are representing purely private clients to invoke the
judicial process by charging another private person with

Under RICO, the private lawyer exercises power that

crimes.

normally is reserved to public officials and grand jurors:
the power to lodge a formal accusation of crime.

Those public

officials and grand jurors, Of course, have a duty of fair ness

and restraint in deciding whether to make that kind of accusa
tion.

As the Supreme Court once described the special respon

sibilities of prosecutors:
"The United States Attorney is the representa
tive not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impar
tially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer." Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
A private lawyer, by contrast, owes allegiance

to his client’s private interest, not to a higher sense of
justice.
advocacy.

His interest is not in impartiality, but in partisan

He is his client’s servant, not the servant of the

10

law.

Bis client's interest is not that "justice" be done, but

that he obtain money from the defendant.

Because of these fundamental differences, our system
surrounds the exercise of prosecutorial power with many legal

and ethical restrictions not applicable to the private attor
ney.

The officials who exercise prosecutorial discretion are

accountable to the public for their judgments.

As a further

shield against overzealousness, the Constitution interposes
grand jurors who, like the prosecutor himself, are sworn to

secrecy while the prosecutor is attempting to demonstrate that

there is substantial evidence to justify a proposed criminal
charge.

None of these restrictions, however, applies to a

private lawyer who is considering filing a civil lawsuit in
order to promote his client's financial interests.
The private claimant's power to brand a businessman

or firm a "racketeer" may cause almost as much irreversible
injury to the legitimate businessman as may an unwarranted

criminal charge.

Business rivals may use this power to gain

economic advantage without actually having to go beyond the

threat to file a civil RICO suit.

The people who are monitor

ing the actual use of civil RICO know that this is the reality
not mere speculation.
decision:

As Justice Marshall noted in the Sedima

”[T]he defendant, facing a tremendous financial

exposure in addition to the threat of being labelled a 'rac

keteer,' will have a strong interest in settling the dispute."
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53 U.S.L.W. at 5041.

Ironically, therefore, civil RICO

creates an opportunity for civil claimants to engage in a form
of extortion, even though the criminal features of the statute

are geared to prevent similar exactions by organized crime

figures.
Several recent RICO cases illustrate the full range

of the distortion to which the present language of the civil

RICO provision lends itself and the difficulties the courts
are having in applying the statute sensibly.

In at least two

instances RICO has been invoked in religious squabbles, and

the trial judges have struggled to make RICO inapplicable.

In

Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125

(D. Mass. 1982), the district court was faced with a claim
brought by a disaffected former adherent of the Scientologists

alleging fraudulent misrepresentations.

The RICO claim in

Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555

(E.D.N.Y. 1983), turned on a dispute about the proper suc

cession to the "Skolyer Rebbe," a Chassidic Jewish leadership
position.

The plaintiffs invoked "mail fraud" and other

predicate offenses based on alleged misrepresentations by the

defendants about their right to administer the congregation.1/
the bizarre uses to which RICO may be put are not

limited to religious disputes.

RICO is being used as well in

1/The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that
the religious issues were non-justiciable.
566 F. Supp. at
558.
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disputes between spouses and over inheritance.

See Report of

the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corpora

tion, Banking and Business Law ("ABA RICO Task Force Report")
39 n.41 (1985).

In another recent case, a RICO suit was filed

against former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democratic
National Committee and several individual members of the DNC,
alleging that the defendants offered political contributions

to other Democratic candidates in exchange for promises not

to oppose Reagan Administration policies.

While the court

dismissed the claim, it did so solely on the ground that the

plaintiffs had failed to allege acts that fell within the
predicate acts specified in the statute.. Taylor v. Mondale,
Civ. No. 84-3149 (D.D.C. May 7, 1985), reported in Civil RICO

Report (BNA), June 5, 1985, at 6.

Thus, the court found

nothing wrong with the basic use of RICO, only with the choice
of the particular criminal acts pleaded as predicate offenses.
In addition, at least one federal court has held that the

fraud predicates supported a civil RICO claim for damages
against FBI agents who orchestrated an undercover "sting"

operation.

Lightner v. Tremont Auto Auction, No. 82C 20090

(N.D. Ill. June 29, 1984), reported in 1 RICO Litigation
Reporter 317 (September 1984).

It is hard to imagine a more

glaring illustration of the point that civil RICO is now being

used against the very people it was designed to aid.
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B.

Civil RICO Suits Are Directed
Mostly At Well Established
Businesses, Wot Organized Crime

The American Bar Association's special RICO Task
Force recently collected comprehensive data about hundreds
of private civil RICO cases, almost all of which have been
reported since 1982.2/

The Report classified the essential

allegations underlying the RICO charges as follows:
Percentage

Underlying Allegation

40%

securities fraud

37%

common law fraud in a
commercial setting

4%

antitrust or unfair competition

4%

bribery or commercial bribery

3%

other fraud

2%

labor disputes

1%

theft or conversion

9%

offenses associated with
professional criminal
act ivity 3/

Another private survey located 132 civil RICO cases
in which opinions have been published.

According to the

descriptions of allegations contained in those cases, they
fall into the following categories:

2/ABA RICO Task Force Report at 53, 55 (of the cases
collected in the Report’s database, 3% were decided prior to
1980, 2% were decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in
1983, and 43% in 1984).
3/Id. at 55-56.
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Securities transactions

57

Commercial and contract disputes

38

Commodities trading

6

Bank loans

6

Antitrust price fixing

3

Religious disputes

2

Divorce

1

Union affairs

3

Commercial bribery/kickbacks

2

Political corruption (including
official extortion and bribery)

9

Theft (by cleaners from apartment dwellers)

1

Violent crimes (murder, arson, extortion)

3

Thus, cases that could fairly be characterized as having

anything to do with aiding the war on organized crime are

4/
a tiny minority.4/

In his recent testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the need for civil RICO reform, Assistant Attorney
General Trott of the Department of Justice reported that the

Department's own survey of private RICO cases confirmed this
pattern of massive abuse.

He estimated that, as a result of

4/Both the majority and minority opinions in the Sedima
accepted and cited these statistics. 53 U.S.L.W. at 5039 n.16,
5041. Both recognized that this result was not what Congress
intended; they diverged only on the question whether the courts
may properly do anything to prevent future use of the statute
in this manner. The majority concluded that this is a task
for Congress, not the courts. See pp. 31-35, infra.
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the increasing use of civil RICO in commercial disputes, the
actual number of private cases filed already exceeds 500.

According to the Justice Department's calculations, only about

71 of these cases involve either actual organized crime
figures or the kinds of criminal conduct common to organized

crime syndicates.

As Assistant Attorney General Trott con

cluded:

"Experience has shown . . . that the instances
of private civil RICO's use against traditional
organized crime activities are far outweighed by
example of its application as a general federal
anti-fraud remedy against seemingly reputable
businessmen.”
On some occasions, private plaintiffs have used
civil RICO to pursue people who had first Seen prosecuted and

convicted of the predicate acts or RICO itself.

The three

civil RICO cases noted in the private survey of 132 cases
which involved allegations of gangster-like conduct — murder,

arson and extortion — were cases filed after the authorities
had obtained criminal convictions.

See Anderson v. Janovich,

543 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (tavern owner claimed that

convicted competitors tried to control local tavern business
through threats of murder and arson); State Farm Fire and

Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1982)

(insurance company sought to recover fraudulently

obtained proceeds after convictions in arson-for-hire case);
City of Milwaukee v. Hansen, No. 77-C-246 (E.D. Wis. January

13, 1981) (city sought to recover costs incurred in fighting
fires started by convicted arsonists).
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In addition, about a

dozen other civil RICO cases have followed criminal convic
tions, generally for some form of political corruption.

In

one recent case, the Seventh Circuit upheld a RICO judgment

against a defendant sued after he had pleaded guilty to
charges of mail fraud based on the same conduct.
lough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1985).

See McCul

In another

recently filed action, a corporation brought RICO claims
against, inter alia, two individuals who had recently pleaded

guilty to federal securities law violations.

Anheuser-Busch

Companies, Inc. v. Thayer, No. 3-85-0794-R (N.D. Tex.; com
plaint filed April 26, 1985), reported in Racketeer Litigation
Reporter at 695 (May 1985).

RICO thus can be, and has been,

used to pursue civil remedies against convicted felons.
In most civil RICO cases, however, the public author
ities have not found a basis to proceed with any criminal
charges.

There has been, therefore, no careful screening by

publicly accountable officials before private claimants have

charged those defendants with criminal "racketeering."

This

is not surprising, because public officials would not have

considered it fair or accurate to brand the defendants in

these cases "racketeers.”

Indeed, one commentator, who

maintains the computerized database of civil RICO decisions

upon which the ABA RICO Task Force relied and who served as
Executive Director of that Task Force, concluded that, "real
istically speaking, the likelihood of state or federal prose

cutors seeking indictments in the vast majority of these types
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of cases is as close to zero as anything could be."

Weissman,

"Circuit Aims To Curb Private Civil RICO Actions," Legal Times,

August 20, 1984, at 12.

Thus, these civil cases are not sup

plementing the enforcement efforts of prosecutors who simply
lack the resources to deal with all the offenses deserving
Instead, these cases involve, with rare excep

prosecution.

tions, disputes that no responsible prosecutor would brand as

criminal, much less as the manifestations of "organized crime*

or "racketeering."
Although the burden of RICO's misuse does not fall

solely on persons in the financial community and in related
professional services, the burden has become especially severe

for these people because they are viewed as vulnerable "deep

pockets" whenever an investment or a commercial transaction

goes sour.

As The New York Times reported, despite the

expectation that civil RICO would focus on "mobster deals,”

"legitimate businesses” such as Morgan Stanley, American
Express, and Lloyd's of London have "found their names smeared

with racketeering charges. . . ."
1984, at D2.5/

N.Y. Times, September 4,

A partial roster of defendants in civil RICO

suits includes the following established and respected enti
ties that private claimants have charged with a "pattern of

racketeering":

5/In light of civil RICO's unintended use as a weapon
against "ordinary enterprises," The New York Times recently
called for a legislative "repair job" on RICO's civil treble
damage provisions. "Where To Fix The Rackets Law," N.Y. Times,
July 8, 1985, at A16.
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Investment bankers and broken
Beebe Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.
Bear Sterns & Co.
Dean Witter Reynolds
Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.
Loeb Rhodes & Co., Inc.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner a Smith, Inc.
Morgan Stanley a Co., Inc.
Oppenheimer a Co.
Paine Webber Jackson a Curtis, Inc.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.
Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc.
National C.P.A. Firms

Alexander Grant & Company
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand
Ernst & Whinney
Laventhol & Horwath
Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co.
Price Waterhouse
Touche Ross & Co.
Law Firms

Lord, Bissel & Brook
Pierson, Ball & Dowd
Singer, Hutner, Levine a Seemans
Sullivan a Worchester
Banks
Citibank, N.A.
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
Crocker National Bank
First American Bankshares, Inc.
First Interstate Bank of Oregon
First National Bank of Atlanta
First National Bank of Maryland
Marine National Bank (Wisconsin)
National Republic Bank of Chicago
Pacific Western Bank
Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C.
Sierra Federal Savings & Loan Association
Southwest National Bank
State Bank of India
Union Bank
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Insurance Companies
Allstate Insurance Co.
Lincoln Insurance Co.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Travelers Insurance Co.
Underwriters of Lloyd's, London
USLIFE Corp.

Manufacturing Companies
A.H. Robins Co., Inc.
Boeing Co.
Continental Group, Inc.
General Motors Corp.
Miller Brewing Co.
Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc.
Rockwell International Corp.
Rohm & Haas Co.
Firms like those have been named as defendents in dozens of

civil RICO suits, even though the Justice Department has not

seen merit enough even to file criminal charges against them,

much less to obtain convictions.

Of course, the enormous

expenses associated with defending against unchecked civil

RICO claims become a cost of doing business that ultimately
taxes the consumers of the goods and services provided by
these firms and by their customers and clients.

C.

Civil RICO Is Used Most Extensively
In Ordinary Commercial Disputes

As the figures demonstrate, the vast bulk of private
civil RICO cases have come in commercial contexts — hardly
in the settings that Congress thought needed bold new weapons

or special incentives to sue.

All its sponsors expressly

agreed that RICO was aimed at preventing the infiltration of
legitimate business by organized crime.
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The draftsmen certainly did not intend, for example,

to have RICO become a device for challenging corporate takeover
bids or to add a new level of regulation of those hotly
contested deals.

Yet, as SEC member Charles Marinaccio told

this Committee in May of this year, "[i]t has become standard
practice to add a RICO charge to lawsuits challenging tender

offers."

Statement of Charles L. Marinaccio, Member of the

Securities and Exchange Commission, Before the Committee on

the Judiciary, United States Senate, May 20, 1985, at 3;

see, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.
1983); Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.,
592 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Tex.), modified, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.
1984).

In Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, supra, the court of

appeals expressed concern about attempts to use RICO to block
a takeover bid through a public tender offer, pointing out

that this is simply one illustration of the unintended and
excessive use of civil RICO:

"Finally, we note the mounting controversy in the
federal courts over the proper limits, if any,
upon the use of RICO in cases far removed from
the context which Congress had in mind when it
enacted the statute. Congress was out to attack
the problem of organized crime, not the problem
of corporate control and risk arbitrage. We of
course make no attempt to resolve the dispute
here and now. We do not propose to enter the
fray. We only note that the reach of RICO is
itself a troubling issue . . . ." 701 F.2d at 291.
See also Tyson & August, The Williams Act After RICO:

Has The

Balance Tipped In Favor Of Incumbent Management?, 35 Hastings
L.J. 53, 111-12 (1983) ("By giving target management a powerful
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new weapon in the takeover battle, the judicial approval of

RICO suits predicated on Williams Act violations undermines
the careful policy of evenhandedness that the Williams Act

Congress sought so hard to attain").
The treble-damage weapon of RICO and the "racketeer

ing" label are also being used to challenge the ways banks set
up their loan procedures and terms.

For instance, in Morosani

v, First National Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir.

1983), the Eleventh Circuit has allowed a case to proceed on
the claim that the "prime rate” used in computing the interest

on the plaintiff's loan was not the bank's true prime rate.
The Supreme Court recently agreed that RICO sweeps so broadly

as to encompass such a case.

See Haroco v. American National

Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, ___
U.S. ___ , 53 U.S.L.W. 5067 (July 1, 1985) (per curiam).

In

Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. Ill. 1982), the court
explained why it, too, felt obliged to entertain a RICO suit

involving alleged misrepresentations relating to a commerc
ial

loan:

"Congress may not have envisioned that the civil
remedies it supplied in RICO would find the wide
spread use that they have in commercial fraud
cases. And such use of RICO's remedies may well
be somewhat undesirable. But, when a plaintiff
makes allegations which appear to state a claim
under the statute as it is written, it is not the
function of this Court to reject that claim on the
ground that Congress must have meant something
other than what it said in the statute." 557
F. Supp. at 681.
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RICO counts have already appeared in many other cases

involving disputed commercial transactions, including churning
of stock,6/ representations about a broker's expertise,7/ pro

jections used in real estate syndication,8/ disputes between

landlord and tenant,9/ disallowance of insurance claims,10/
alleged overcharges by a printer,11/ and failure to publish

a medical journal according to a contractual agreement.12/

Because Congress included open-ended "fraud” predicates, there
is ample room for transforming even more kinds of commercial

disputes into RICO cases.

Although the "fraud" predicates are the easiest to
abuse by artful pleading, they are not alone.

In a recent

decision, the Fourth Circuit ordered reinstatement of a civil
RICO case brought by a condominium developer who alleged that

6/see, e.g., Harper v. New Japan Securities International,
Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal 1982).
7/See, e.g., Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo.
1983).

8/Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
9/pit Pros, Inc. v. Wolf, 554 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill.
1983).

10/Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp.
352 (E.D. Mich. 1983).

11/Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Harco Graphics, Inc., 558 F. Supp.
83 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
12/American Society of Contemporary Medicine, Surgery
& Opthalmology v. Murray Communications, Inc., 547 F. Supp.
462 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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the purchasers of an office condominium unit were trying to

"extort" an unreasonably high price from him in connection

with the developer's effort to repurchase the condo unit in
order to include it in a block of units the developer wanted
to sell to IBM.

Although the district court found that this

was *at best a garden-variety commercial breach of contract”

case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the allegations might
make out a claim of ”extortion” under state law and, there

fore, the plaintiff could press the case under RICO.

Battle

field Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
The two businessmen who originally bought the condominium unit

—and their wives as co-defendants — now stand accused of

being racketeers and must defend themselves against a statute
that Congress believed would protect business people from, in

Representative Steiger's words, ”ruthless organized criminals.

D.

The Inclusion Of Fraud-Based Predicate
Offenses Is The Source Of Most Of The
Abuse Of Civil RICO

Without doubt, the single most important aspect

of RICO that permits plaintiffs to transform commerc
ial
disputes into federal treble-damage actions is the inclusion

of "mail fraud,” "wire fraud,” and "fraud in the sale of

securities" in the list of predicate offenses.

The com

prehensive survey by the ABA Special Task Force on Civil RICO
ascertained that 91% of RICO claims appear in cases that

involve sales of securities or commodities or relate to
contract disputes or other ordinary commercial transactions.
See ABA RICO Task Force Report at 55-56.
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Although Congress

added the fraud-based predicates at a time when RICO did not

provide for a private remedy, and it added the private remedy

at the last minute without careful consideration of how it
would be used, the result, to quote the words of Justice

Marshall in Sedima, "quite simply revolutionizes private
litigation."

53 U.S.L.W. at 5040.

Justice Marshall went on:

"The single most significant reason for the expansive use of

civil RICO has been the presence in the statute, as predicate
acts, of mail and wire fraud violations."

Id.

Be similarly

recognized that the fraud-based predicates allow a plaintiff
to bypass the federal securities laws in favor of a claim

under RICO.

Id. at 5041.

The result. Justice Marshall and

these other Justices realized, is "the federalization of broad

areas of state common law of frauds, and . . . the displacement
of well-established federal remedial provisions."

Id. at 5040.

Claims based on "mail fraud" and "wire fraud" pre
dicate offenses are easy to plead in many commercial disputes.

They are also likely to survive motions to dismiss made at

early stages.

This is so because the underlying law in this

area has been developed in criminal prosecutions under broadly
worded criminal statutes.

Courts have been willing to allow

public officials to use broad prosecutorial discretion in
determining which transactions are properly prosecutable:
"The crime of mail fraud is [broad] in scope.
The fraudulent aspect of the scheme to ’defraud'
is measured by a non-technical standard.
Law
puts its imprimatur on the accepted moral stan
dards and condemns conduct which fails to match
the ’reflection of moral uprightness, of fun
damental honesty, fair play and right dealing
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in the general and business life of members of
society.' This is indeed broad." Blachly v.
United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967)
(citations omitted).
In almost any instance where a venture has lost money, or a
stock has fallen in value, a disappointed investor can allege

that the businessman’s behavior was not a "reflection of
moral uprightness" and "fair play.”

As Justice Marshall noted

in his opinion in Sedima:
"The effects of making a mere two instances of
mail or wire fraud potentially actionable under
civil RICO are staggering, because in recent
years Courts of Appeals have 'tolerated an
extraordinary expansion of mail and wire fraud
statutes to permit federal prosecution for
conduct that some had thought was subject only
to state criminal and civil law.'" 53 U.S.L.W.
at 5040, quoting United States v. Weiss, 752
F.2d 777, 791 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman J., dis
senting ).
Justice Marshall recognized that "(t]he only restrain
ing influence on the 'inexorable expansion of the mail and
wire fraud statutes,' United States v. Siegal, 717 F.2d, at 24

(Winter, J., dissenting in part), has been the prudent use of
prosecutorial discretion."

53 U.S.L.W. at 5040.

The courts

have permitted the expansive reading of the mail and wire

fraud statute knowing full well that no private right of
action existed under those criminal statutes.

Id.

Although

Congress has never directly authorized private civil suits

under the mail or wire fraud statutes, the inclusion of
those offenses among the predicates for a civil suit under

RICO now has given this vast discretion to private claimants

through the back door.
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The result, as Justice Marshall wrote, is an enormous
expansion in federal jurisdiction over ordinary civil disputes:

"In the context of civil RICO . . . the restraining
influence of prosecutors is completely absent. . . .
[S]uch litigants, lured by the prospect of treble
damages and attorney's fees, have a strong incentive
to invoke RICO's provisions whenever they can allege
in good faith two instances of nail or wire
fraud. . . . The civil RICO provision consequently
stretches the mail and wire fraud statutes to their
absolute limits and federalizes important areas of
civil litigation that until now were solely within
the domain of the states." Id. at 5041.
As one former federal prosecutor recently wrote in calling for

legislation to delete "the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes

from the list of predicate acts required to bring a private

civil RICO action:"
"[A] general problem with RICO, that the constraints
of prosecutorial discretion and guidelines which
limit its application in the criminal sphere are no
bar to its private civil application . . ., is most
acute when the underlying predicate statutes are
mail fraud and wire fraud, since it is the breadth
of these statutes, both actual and potential, that
forms the basis for most of the recent expansion of
civil RICO litigation." Rakoff, "Opinion," 1 RICO
Litigation Reporter 206-07, 211 (September 1984).
Nothing in the legislative history of RICO suggests

Congress intended to federalize local commercial disputes.
Continued inclusion of "mail fraud" and "wire fraud* as predi

cates for civil RICO claims, however, allows private plaintiffs

to disregard these concerns about federalism and to transform
local disputes into federal cases simply because one of the

parties used the mail or the telephone.

Similarly, private plaintiffs find it easy to level
allegations of "securities fraud."
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Since the federal courts

are reluctant to dismiss complaints before a plaintiff has

had a chance to pursue substantial discovery in a search of

evidence to support his allegations of "fraud," these cases

Even if the predicate offense

withstand initial challenges.

that a plaintiff must ultimately prove in a civil RICO case

is criminal securities fraud, a plaintiff may not even have
to allege — much less prove -- a deliberate intent to defraud

him.

For example, in United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311

(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976), the court

upheld the conviction of a partner in a major accounting
firm.

On the basis of a finding that he had "recklessly"

conducted a corporate audit, he was convicted of assisting in

the corporation's filing of a false proxy statement in viola
tion of 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).

The trial judge, in sentencing

the accountant, indicated that no finding of actual knowledge
of falsity was necessary for conviction:
"I think you are absolutely sincere when you say
that you do not believe that you did anything
wrong in this audit or audits. . . . But the
tragedy is that the jury found that this was an
audit or audits done with reckless disregard for
what was really involved." United States v.
Natelli, 74 Cr. 43 (S.D.N.Y.), Transcript of
Sentencing at 12.

Thus, a plaintiff may be able to assert a viable RICO claim
based on alleged "fraud in the sale of securities" simply by

claiming that the defendants were reckless in their actions,
and that, as a result, a "fraudulent" filing or similar
securities law violation occurred.
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Moreover, the result of converting securities fraud

claims into RICO claims is to displace the carefully structured
remedies of the federal securities laws. First, civil RICO has

unwittingly created a treble-damage remedy for ordinary

securities law violations even though "the federal securities

laws contemplate only compensatory damages and ordinarily do
not authorize recovery of attorney’s fees."
U.S.L.W. at 5041 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Sedima, 53
Second, under

RICO the plaintiff can raise the non-monetary stakes as well,
because now the defendant runs the risk of being branded a
"racketeer."

As Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and

Powell recognized, the result of this double-barrel risk is
not justice, but capitulation:

"Many a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure,
will decide to settle even a case with no merit.
It is thus not surprising that civil RICO has been
used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the
very evils that it was designed to combat." Id.

Third, and perhaps most important, this use of civil
RICO "virtually eliminates decades of legislative and judicial
development of private civil remedies under the federal securi

ties laws."

Id.

This end-run around the requirements of the

securities laws is possible because a RICO plaintiff can simply

allege a RICO violation based on mail or wire fraud predicate
acts, rather than "securities fraud," growing out of a securi
ties transaction.

Thus, despite that fact that "[o]ver the

years, courts have paid close attention to matters such as
standing, culpability, causation, reliance and materiality,

as well as the definitions of ’securities’ and 'fraud,'" id.,
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the broad swath that the civil RICO's fraud provisions cut
through established legal principles makes all of this care

fully fashioned law "now an endangered species . . . ."

Id.

The Senate added securities fraud, as well as wire
and mail fraud, to the bill's list of predicates at the

suggestion of the SEC's Division of Enforcement because
organized crime figures had begun to engage in market manipu
lation and securities theft.

The SEC officials recommended

the changes when they understood that the legislation would

provide only for government, not private, remedies.

They

believed that RICO could serve as an important weapon for
government enforcement against those activities.

Civil RICO Task Report at 99-100 n.130.

See ABA

When the House added

the private civil remedy, no one suggested that the securities

fraud predicate was intended to displace the specific statutory
scheme long in place.
Moreover, when Congress decided to add securities
fraud as a RICO predicate, it referred to only one significant
kind of misconduct that was not already covered by the federal

securities laws but was attracting organized crime:

ing in stolen or counterfeit securities.

traffick

Experience has shown,

however, that civil RICO is not being used against schemes of

that type.

By including the securities fraud predicates, RICO

instead allows private claimants to duplicate — but for
treble damages — the rights already granted by the federal

securities laws or allows them to circumvent the limitations
that Congress has deliberately fashioned for civil suits under
30

In neither type of situation is there any justi

those laws.

fication for tolerating the costly mischief that civil RICO

permits.

E.

The Supreme Court Has Held That
Congress, Not the Courts, Must
Correct Civil RICO*S Overbreadth

Up until recently, several trial judges and one
federal circuit attempted to restrain the use of civil RICO
in ordinary commercial disputes.

Some tried to treat the

statute as requiring an allegation of some actual connection

with "organized crime."

E.g., American Savings Ass'n v.

Sierra Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 586 F. Supp. 888 (D.

Colo. 1984).

Others tried to require a showing of some

special "racketeering injuries."

E.g., Harper v. New Japan

Securities International Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal.
1982).

These efforts generally met with hostility in most

appellate courts.

See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,

719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280
(1984) (rejecting requirement of link to "organized crime");

Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir.

1984) (same); Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc.,
731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984)

(same); Schacht v. Brown, 711

F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983)
(rejecting special injury requirement); Alexander Grant & Co.

v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984)

(same).
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This past term, the Supreme Court dashed whatever

faint hope had existed that judicial construction of the

statute could tame runaway civil RICO.

In a 5-4 vote, the

Court overturned a decision of the Second Circuit in which the
court of appeals had held that a civil RICO claim could only

be brought against a defendant who had been convicted of the
predicate acts underlying the RICO claim or of RICO itself

and could only be brought to collect damages for a separate
"racketeering injury," wholly distinct from injury arising

from the predicate acts themselves.

Sedima, supra.

At the

same time, the Court affirmed a Seventh Circuit decision in

which the lower court had rejected the requirement of a

separate injury.

American National Bank v. Haroco, Inc., ___

U.S. ___ , 53 U.S.L.W. 5067 (July 1, 1985) (per curiam).

In

deciding these cases, the Court made it crystal clear that any
correction in the course civil RICO has taken must come from

Congress, not the courts.
The Court was unanimous in recognizing that civil

RICO had strayed far from the object that Congress had in

mind when it wrote and passed the Act.

The majority opinion

in Sedima acknowledged that it understood the "concern over
the consequences of an unbridled reading of the statute," and

the Second Circuit’s perception of "misuse of civil RICO."
53 U.S.L.W. at 5034.

The majority opinion also recognized

that, "in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into
something quite different from the original conception of
its enactors," id. at 5039, and that "private civil actions
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under the statute are being brought almost solely against"
what the Court called "respected and legitimate enterprises,"
rather than against "the archetypal, intimidating mobster.”

Id.

And the majority cited with approval the statistics from

the ABA Task Force Report, see pp. 14-15, supra, that bear out

that conclusion.

53 U.S.L.W. at 5039 n.16.

As the quotations throughout this Appendix suggest,

Justice Marshall, writing in dissent for four members of the

Court, was even more explicit in detailing the ways in which

civil RICO claims have caused disruptions far beyond anything
intended by Congress, but the majority did not disagree with

Justice Marshall detailed the
♦
ways that "in both theory and practice, civil RICO has brought

the dissenters' descriptions.

profound changes to our legal landscape,” id. at 5041, and he

recognized that "nothing in the language of the statute or the
legislative history suggests that Congress intended either the

federalization of state common law or the displacement of
existing federal remedy.”

Id.

Justice Marshall's opinion

summarized the problematic results of civil RICO:

"These cases take their toll; their results
distort the market by saddling legitimate
businesses with uncalled-for punitive bills
and undeserved labels. To allow punitive
actions and significant damages for injury
beyond that which the statute was intended
to target is to achieve nothing the statute
sought to achieve, and ironically to injure
many of those lawful businesses that the
statute sought to protect." Id. at 5045.

Justice Marshall as a general matter is neither a strident
supporter of states’ rights nor an advocate of business
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interests against the injured individual; yet he concluded in

no uncertain terns that civil RICO has unintentionally altered
the balance between federal and state law in a profound manner

and has made legitimate businesses a target of "uncalled-for
punitive bills and undeserved labels."

Id. at 5045.

Justice Powell, who joined in Justice Marshall's
opinion, also wrote separately, reiterating the manner in

which civil RICO has come to be used "against legitimate

businesses seeking treble damages in ordinary fraud and
contract cases,” and concluding that "it defies rational

belief, particularly in light of the legislative history,
that Congress intended this far-reaching result."

Id. at

5047.
The majority and minority parted company only over
the question of whether the courts could play any role in
narrowing civil RICO's reach.

The minority believed that

the language of the statute could plausibly be interpreted

narrowly in certain respects.

The majority, applying its

philosophical belief that the courts should not rewrite

statutes, accepted the premise that the statute is being used
in unintended ways but rejected the notion that the Court
could play any role in solving that dilemma.

The majority

placed responsibility for solving the problem upon the repre

sentative body that passed the statute in the first place:
"(T]his defect — if defect it is — is inherent in the
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statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress."

Id. at 5039 (emphasis added).
F.

Civil RICO Claims Against
Legitimate Businesses Are Burgeoning

It is likely that, in the face of the Supreme

Court's rejection of the major judicial attempts to construe
civil RICO narrowly and its deferral to Congress to correct
the overbreadth, RICO suits simply alleging securities fraud,
commercial fraud, or other "imaginative" claims will continue

to grow.

The situation is already out of hand and likely to

get worse.

Relatively few private RICO cases have progressed
*
•
all the way to judgment, because intensive use of the statute

in civil cases only began to blossom a few years ago.

The ABA

RICO Task Force Report found that, although the statute was

enacted in 1970, there was only one reported opinion in a
civil RICO case as of 1972, only one other case reported prior

to 1975, and only nine reported decisions prior to 1980.

RICO Task Force Report at 55.
grown exponentially.

Id.

ABA

Since then, the numbers have

See also p. 14 n.2, supra.

The

invocation of RICO against legitimate businesses in kinds of
disputes never contemplated by Congress when it passed RICO is
almost certain to accelerate in the wake of the recent Supreme

Court decisions, since the Court has eliminated almost any

chance that previously existed that a defendant could defeat

a RICO claim at the threshold of litigation.

Reflecting this

impact, the Washington Post headlined its article on the Sedima
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decision:

"RULING SEEN INCREASING OUT-OF-COURT SETTLEMENTS:

More Costly Litigation Also Predicted."

Abramowitz, Washing

ton Post, July 2 1985, at E10.

In addition, there is rapidly spreading publicity
about the utility of RICO as a device for getting a local
commercial dispute into federal court or as a tactic for
dramatically increasing the stakes in a case otherwise covered

by the traditional single-damage remedy of other, specific

federal laws, such as the securities laws.

The Washington

Post story on Sedima quoted a leading plaintiff's attorney
who predicted that civil RICO would be used increasingly in

the future to "federalize" product liability Litigation.

Id.

The same day, the Wall Street Journal also commented that

civil RICO suits, "few of which involve organized crime, are
proliferating because they can be quite lucrative."

Wermeil,

"Supreme Court Refuses to Curb Racketeer Law," Wall Street
Journal, July 2, 1985, at 2.
lure:

The article summarized the

"Plaintiffs favor RICO because of the chance to triple

damages and win attorneys' fees and legal costs, and because

it poses fewer procedural hurdles than federal securities law

or state contract law."

Id.

As another article discussing

the wider use of civil RICO expected in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision put it in its headline:
The Civil RICO's Juggernaut Steams On."

Mathews and Weissman,

Legal Times (ABA Daily Ed.), July 9, 1985, at 10.
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"'Sedima':

Legal and business journals are filled with articles
discussing the statute.

See, e.g., Blakey, "RICO Is Working,"

The Brief (the magazine published by the Tort and Insurance

Practice Section of the American Bar Association), Summer 1985,
at 18; Quinn and Bograd, "RICO Is Backfiring," id. at 19;
Pickholz, "The Firestorm Over Civil RICO,* 71 ABA Journal 79

(1985); Skinner and Tone, "Recent Developments in RICO Litiga

tion," National Law Journal, February 13, 1984, at 20; Skinner
and Tone, "Civil RICO and the Corporate Defendant," National
Law Journal, January 30, 1984, at 22; Flaherty, "Private RICO

Damages Awarded," National Law Journal, December 26, 1983, at
8; Sylvester, "Civil RICO's New Punch," National Law journal,

February 7, 1983, at 1; Weissmann, "'Moss' Makes RICO Statute
the Darling of Plaintiffs' Bar," Legal Times, December 19,

1983, at 24; Murphy, "RICO — A Federal Treble Damage Fraud
Statute?", New York State Bar Journal, July 1983, at 18;
"Business is Picking Up An Anticrime Weapon," Business Week,

February 20, 1984, at 85.
So too, law reviews are focusing a great deal of

attention on the statute, debating the extent of its flaws
and the proper methods of correcting them.

See, e.g., Civil

RICO Symposium, 21 Cal. W. L. Rev. No. 2 (1985); Comment,
Sedima v. Imrex:

Civil Immunity for Unprosecuted RICO Vio

lations?, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 419 (1985); Note, Civil RICO:

A

Call For A Uniform Statute of Limitations, 13 Fordham Urban
L.J. 205 (1984); Sackheim, Leto & Friedman, Commodities Liti
gation:

The Impact of RICO, 34 DePaul L. Rev. 23 (1984);

37

Tyson 6 August, The Williams Act After RICO:

Has The Balance

Tipped In Favor Of Incumbent Management, 35 Hastings L.J. 53

(1983); Note, RICO and Securities Fraud:

A Workable Limita

tion, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1513 (1983); Note, Civil RICO:

The

Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 Barv.

L. Rev. 1101 (1982); Campbell, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial
Litigation, 36 Sw. L.J. 925 (1982).

One recently published

bibliography listed approximately 150 articles on civil RICO

that have appeared in legal publications.

See Milner, A Civil

RICO Bibliography, 21 Cal. W.L. Rev. 409, 427-35 (1985).

Numerous how-to-do-it courses are being offered
nationwide to acquaint lawyers with RICO’s possibilities.
For example, the ABA already has held four "continuing legal
education” National Institutes on RICO, three in New York City
in September 1983, February 1984 and October 1984, and one in

Los Angeles in November 1983.

With ominous accuracy the ABA

titled the first three of these sessions "RICO:
Weapon in Business and Commercial Litigation."

The Ultimate

The latest

session, in New York, was entitled "RICO — The Second Stage."

Among the featured topics at the October 1984 meeting were
discussions of RICO and its impact on states and municipali

ties, RICO suits by and against unions, and RICO suits against
financial institutions. The popularity of the presentations is

great; the mailing for the February 1984 course pointed out

that the two earlier meetings were sold out, with over 600
lawyers in attendance.

Moreover, one of the programs held at

the ABA's August 1984 annual convention was entitled "RICO:
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The Current Status of Baby Huey,” and at its most recent

convention just completed in July 1985, the ABA again had
a major program on current developments in civil RICO.

The Practicing Law Institute (”PLI”) also held RICO

sessions in June of 1984 both in New York City and in San
Francisco, with topics including the use of RICO in "antitrust

cases,” "commercial bribery and faithless employee cases,”

"unfair competition cases,” "securities and commodities cases,”
and "corporate takeover cases.”

In addition, Law & Business,

Inc., offered RICO programs in Chicago in June and in San

Francisco in July of last year and plans similar progams in
New York, San Francisco, and Chicago in September, October,

and November 1985, respectively.
The volume of RICO litigation is expected to be

so heavy that a special reporting service called the "RICO

Litigation Reporter" — now renamed the "RICO Law Reporter" —
began regular publication in May 1984, and two additional
reporting services devoted exclusively to this subject recently

began publishing.

The recent Supreme Court decisions, with

the attendant publicity as well as the substantive message

contained in those decisions that it is all right to use civil
RICO broadly, will only increase the spotlight on civil RICO’s

potential uses as a weapon in commercial litigation.
The bonanza for lawyers in RICO cases is widely
and candidly recognized.

Indeed, when the Los Angeles Times

did a series of articles last year on "the litigation explo
sion," it devoted a front page article just to private civil
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RICO suits, entitling the feature, "'RICO’ Running Amok in the

Board Rooms," and subtitling the piece, "Law aimed at Mafia

becomes popular in private suits."

February 15, 1984.

Siegel, Los Angeles Times,

The article quoted one RICO lawyer as

explaining that when he set up his private law practice he

*was looking for a way to develop business,* and he *studied
RICO and saw the potential for lots of civil litigation."

As

the Supreme Court recognized, as long as the statute remains

worded broadly, lawyers will have every incentive to continue
pushing its use to the outer limits of the statutory language.
As one author counseled:

*[A] plaintiff's attorney zealously protecting
the rights of his client, as he is charged to
do, is obligated to bring RICO claims where
they can reasonably be interposed.” Brodsky,
"RICO," New York Law Journal, February 15, 1984,
at p. 1, Col. 1.
Of course, in addition to multiple damages, the

plaintiffs in these actions seek attorney's fees.

While there

are few civil RICO cases that have progressed far enough to

have reached the fee-determination stage, the amounts at issue
are substantial.13/

Awards of hundreds of thousands or even

millions of dollars are not uncommon under other statutes that

contain similar "fee shifting" provisions.

The prospect of

13/For example, in Schacht v. Brown, supra, the lead
counsel for the plaintiff Insurance Commissioner reported
billings of $363,737.00 through September of 1982. "Insurance
Liquidations a Legal Bonanza," Chicago Tribune, September 12,
1982, § 5 at 1. This may include expenses for some items
in addition to the Schacht litigation itself, but the vast
majority is almost certainly for that civil RICO action, in
a period before any significant discovery had commenced.

40

such handsome awards is a powerful stimulus to press RICO to

even newer frontiers.
V.

REFORM OF CIVIL "RICO" SHOULD REINTRODUCE
THE IMPORTANT OVERSIGHT BY FEDERAL AND
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS BY CREATING A
PRIOR-CRIMINAL-CONVICTION REQUIREMENT

A.

The Administration, The Courts, And
Others Have Recognized The Need For Reform

The explosion of unjustified civil RICO cases is

already at hand, and the adverse effects of this development

on the courts and on legitimate business are direct, palpable,
and unwarranted.

It would be difficult to overstate the in

terrorem effect of civil RICO on legitimatebusinesses, even

though relatively few companies, so far, actually have been

ordered to pay treble damages in these cases.

As Business

Week reported:
"Lawyers say the number of court awards under RICO
is not an accurate measure of the problem, because
few cases go to trial: The mere threat of a headline
suggesting a connection with organized crime often
induces a settlement." February 20, 1984, at 85.
In addition, the scope of the permissible allegations permits
wide-ranging pre-trial discovery:

"That gets very, very

expensive," one securities lawyer was quoted as explaining,
"and the cost tends to result in settlements."

Id.

As Justice

Marshall himself recognized, a "defendant, facing a tremendous
financial exposure in addition to the threat of being labelled

a ’racketeer,' will have a strong interest in settling the

dispute," 53 U.S.L.W. at 5041, "even a case with no merit."

Id.
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In urging reform, the American Bar Association has
stated:

"When RICO is combined with mail fraud predicate
offenses, the effect is to federalize all torts
involving business transactions in which a party
thinks deceitfully and uses the mails. This
result is undesirable in two respects:
(1) the
efficient operation of federal courts will be
significantly impaired, if not crippled, by a tidal
wave of RICO civil actions when plaintiffs become
aware of the attractions of treble damages and
recovery of attorney's fees; and (2) the balance
between state and federal power will be substan
tially disrupted. If future RICO statutes are
to include civil remedies, use of mail fraud as
a predicate offense must be limited." Reports
with Recommendations to the House of Delegates,
ABA, 1982 Annual Meeting, August 1982, Report
No. 112C at 8, adopted by the House of Delegates
August 1982.
According to the recent ABA RICO Task Force Report, fully 741

of all lawyers surveyed with actual experience with RICO
claims, either as counsel for plaintiffs or for defendants,

believe that the statute should be amended, and only 8% see

no need for reform.

ABA RICO Task Force Report at 62.

From his unique vantage point as a regulator of the

securities industry and the accounting profession, SEC Commis
sioner Charles L. Marinaccio expressed his view that civil RICO

has "gone awry in the execution," and is being used against

"the very legitimate corporations and businesses that were
intended to be protected" to undermine the "carefully crafted

structures" of express and implied remedies under state and

federal securities laws.

See Statement of Charles L. Marinac

cio, Member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Before
the Committee on The Judiciary, United States Senate, May 20,
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1985, Exhibit 3.

As the Commissioner told this Committee in

testimony in May of this year, "I believe there is an urgent

need to amend RICO by legislation to end the excessive uses to
which the statute's private civil remedy has been put."
1.

Id. at

The Commissioner recounted the ways in which private civil

RICO is "threatening to disrupt the balance of the (federal

securities] regulatory scheme," id. at 6, and he concluded that
"predicating the availability of a private remedy on prior

criminal convictions offers the most reasonable way to mitigate
problems in the securities fraud area."

Id. at 8.

The Chair

man of the SEC, John S.R. Shad, has also expressed concern

about the unintended impact of civil RICO on "the carefully
crafted scheme of express and implied remedies for securities
law violations which the Congress and the courts have fashioned

over the past 50 years."

Id. Exh. 2.

Federal judges, acting in their capacity as com

mentators on what they are witnessing, also have spoken out

in public about the problem.

Thus, District Judge Milton

Pollack of New York has said:

"(0]ne of the proliferating developments in civil
litigation has been the use of RICO, the Racketeer
Influenced and [Corrupt] Organizations Act, in
civil claims, in routine commercial disputes,
including those arising under the Federal Securi
ties Laws.
I think that the proliferation of
those claims and the use of a law that was designed
to eliminate organized crime is a very bad influ
ence on the commercial community."
"Symposium
Highlighting Developments in Securities Law Over
Past Century," New York Law Journal, January 30,
1984, at 52.

43

And Judge Abner Mikva of the United States Court of

Appeals in the District of Columbia, who had warned against the

overbreadth of the proposed RICO bill when he was in Congress
in 1970, has seen RICO outstrip his worst fears.

Be warned

then that placing a treble-damage remedy under so broadly
worded a statute would provide an "invitation” to the "dis

gruntled and malicious” to "harass innocent businessmen . . . .”
H. R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4083.

As he predicted, "What

a protracted, expensive trial may not succeed in doing, the

adverse publicity may well accomplish — destruction of the

rival's business.”

Id. Judge Mikva was quoted in an interview

as expressing regret that these problems were not avoided by
complete deletion of the civil provision, which "was not an
important element of the legislation."

Los Angeles Times,

February 15, 1984.

In their formal opinions as well, many courts, as
the Supreme Court did in Sedima, have warned about these

dangers and abuses, even while deciding that they are obliged

to apply the expansive language of the statute as originally

written.

For example, in allowing a mail fraud allegation to

proceed as a RICO case, the Seventh Circuit in Schacht ruefully

observed that Congress inadvertently "may well have created
a runaway treble damage bonanza for the already excessively

litigious."

Schacht v. Brown, supra, 711 F.2d at 1361.

In

another Seventh Circuit case, the court observed that RICO

"is constructed on the model of a treasure hunt," Sutliff,
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Inc. v. Donovan Cos., supra, 727 F.2d at 652, and went out of

its way to comment:

"We must abide by Congress's decision, made at a
time of less sensitivity than today to the workload
pressures on the federal courts and to the desir
ability of maintaining a reasonable balance between
state and federal courts, however much we may regret
not only the burdens that the decision has cast
on the federal courts but also the displacement of
state tort law into the federal courts that it has
brought about." Id. at 654.
The Administration has heard these calls for reform
and has decided that they are well founded.

The Vice Presi

dent's Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services, whose
members included the Attorney General, recognized in its final

report adopted on July 2, 1984, that civil RICO. is being
abused.

. •

The Task Group found that:

"[A] statute designed to control organized crime
through both criminal and civil penalties against
racketeering . . . has increasingly been utilized
by imaginative lawyers in suits against banks,
securities firms, accountants and other perfectly
legitimate businesses without even any alleged
connection to organized crime."

The Report continued:

"This litigation increases the backlog in federal
courts, undermines the structure of the substantive
banking and securities laws enacted by Congress, and
creates totally unnecessary costs for the affected
firms and, ultimately, their customers."
Accordingly, one of the Task Group's recommendations (number

5.15) calls for "Elimination of Nuisance Litigation Under RICO.
Without defining precisely how RICO should be amended, the Task

Group states as the Administration's goal the formulation of
amendments "to ensure that its civil liability provisions are
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not Misused by private parties in litigation involving finan
cial institutions."

Attorney General Neese expressed similar concerns

during his nomination hearing before this very Committee.

In

response to a question from Senator Grassley about RICO, Mr.
Meese stated:
"I share with you your concern that what is essen
tially a form of action against criminal activity,
even though with civil penalties and civil actions
involved — that this not be misused as a means of
carrying on ordinary civil litigation where no
organized crime is involved." Transcript of Pro
ceedings (Jan. 30, 1985) at 13.

B.

The Justice Department's RICO Guidelines
Apply The Prosecutorial Discretion Envisioned
By Congress, And Absent From Private Actions,
That Prevents Abuse Of RICO

In 1981, the Criminal Division of the United States
Department of Justice promulgated "Guidelines” for the exercise
of the Department's power to initiate criminal prosecutions
under RICO.

See U.S. Department of Justice, United States

Attorneys' Manual, §§ 9-110.200 - 110.500 (March 9, 1984).

The

Guidelines were promulgated because the Department recognized

the great possibility for abuse if RICO is applied to every set
of circumstances that may conceivably be covered by the broad

statutory language.

These Guidelines in effect formalize the

exercise of prosecutorial discretion that Congress envisioned
when it wrote this broadly worded statute.

In their "Preface," the Guidelines state that,

despite the statutory provision that RICO is to be "liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purpose," it is the
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policy of the Department of Justice that RICO should only be

used "selectively."

The Guidelines are designed to assure

"that not every case, in which technically the elements of a

RICO violation exists, will result in the approval of a RICO

charge."

The Justice Department will not "approve 'imagina

tive' prosecutions under RICO which are far afield from the

Congressional purpose of the RICO statute.”

As the Guidelines

recognize, "the activity which Congress most directly addressed

— the infiltration of organized crime in the nation's economy"
— is the touchstone for determining whether a RICO charge is

warranted.

Moreover, the overall theme of the Guidelines, as
stated in their Preface, is that "the consequences for the
accused" require "particularly careful and reasoned applica

tion" of RICO's purposes before making the decision to charge

a RICO violation.

Accordingly, the Guidelines insist on care

ful monitoring and centralized control over the Government's

filing of any RICO charge.

This centralized monitoring guaran

tees that the Guidelines will be effectively enforced by offi

cials who are charged with public accountability.

In dramatic

contrast, the decision whether to file a private RICO claim
under the broadly worded statute is currently left wholly to
the discretion of entrepreneurial private lawyers.

Their sole

loyalty is to their private clients, and they have no public
responsibility for the consequences of any extravagant allega

tions .
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The Justice Department Guidelines highlight another
problem with civil RICO as it currently stands.

The Preface

states that the Department ordinarily will not add a RICO
charge "which merely duplicates the elements of proof of a
traditional" statute that specifically covers the conduct in

question.

One of the major criticisms of the current civil

RICO provision, however, is that it creates a general, private

federal claim for treble damages even where federal law already
provides a carefully crafted set of prohibitions and remedies.
The Justice Department's Guideline III expressly

directs that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a RICO
count will not be asserted "where the. predicate acts consist *

solely and only of state offenses."

Reflecting important

considerations of federalism, the commentary explains that
this guideline is designed "to underscore the principle that

prosecution of state crimes ... is primarily the responsi
bility of state authority."

Similar observations apply to the use of the fed

eral courts to litigate civil disputes governed by state law.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of "mail fraud" and "wire fraud"
in RICO has been used by private plaintiffs as a device for
bringing into federal courts what are essentially local commer

cial or property disputes.

This use of RICO has "federalized"

state commercial and tort cases.
The statute suggests that any two occurrences of a

predicate violation within ten years may be sufficient to show
a "pattern of racketeering activity."
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Guideline IV recognizes

that this definition is subject to abuse and provides that no
RICO count will be charged "based upon a pattern of racketeer

ing activity growing out of a single criminal episode or

transaction."
Most of the private civil cases that have been filed

under RICO, by contrast, relate to allegedly fraudulent activ
ity in connection with a single episode or transaction, such as

the sale of stock in a single company or the structuring of a

particular venture that includes a number of parties.

Since

each mailing of, for example, a copy of an allegedly misleading
financial statement constitutes a separate violation, it is

easy for the artful pleader .to allege a "pattern" of racketeer
ing in connection with a single commercial episode or transac

tion.

This usage, however, has little to do with the congres

sional goal of cracking down on racketeers who make their
living by engaging in a continuous pattern of illicit activity

over a long career.
In addition, Guideline V states that, in order to

constitute a violation of RICO, the "pattern of racketeering

activity" should have "some relation to the purpose of the
enterprise."

This sensible interpretation is not followed in

the civil cases that have been filed under RICO, where alleg

edly fraudulent activities conducted by legitimate businesses

such as investment banking houses, brokerage firms, accounting

firms, law firms, and others are — even if true — aberra
tional rather than related to the purpose of those "enter

prises."
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Many of the concerns reflected in the Justice

Department Guidelines, thus, apply with equal force to private
civil litigation under RICO.

These internal Guidelines,

however, do not regulate the activity of private plaintiffs.
Therefore, legislation is necessary in order to erect similar

safeguards around the private civil RICO mechanism and in that

way to minimize its great potential for abuse.

C.

A Prior-Criminal-Conviction Requirement
Is The Most Straight-Forward And Workable
Solution To The Current Abuse Of Civil RICO

There is one straight-forward amendment to civil
RICO that would eliminate the existing abuses, refocus the

statute on its intended targets, and adapt the Justice Depart
merit’s Guidelines to the civil use of RICO.

That would be

to permit civil claims to proceed under RICO only after

the defendant has been convicted of a RICO offense or of one
of the predicate offenses.

This amendment would effectively

curb the abuse of the discretionary power to bring private
claims against legitimate business people involved in ordinary
commercial activities.

It would confine the circumstances

in which suits can be filed to those in which public prose

cutors have screened those people who may fairly be charged
with being involved in crimes from those who should not be

subject to accusations of "racketeering".

This is the kind of

protection that a panel of the Second Circuit read into RICO

in the Sedima case and that SEC Commissioner Marinaccio called
upon Congress to write into the statute.
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The American Bar Association's Special Task Force

on Civil RICO also recognized that a prior criminal conviction
requirement would eliminate the abuse of civil RICO and restore

the statute to the purpose Congress originally intended:

"Requiring a criminal conviction as a predicate
to civil treble damage liability under RICO would
alleviate virtually all the problems critics have
posed concerning overbreadth of the civil remedy."
ABA RICO Task Force Report at 222.

What is needed is legislation that will amend 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) so that a private civil plaintiff could only
bring suit against a defendant who has been convicted either

of one of the predicate acts or of a RICO violation itself.
In either case, the conviction would have to be for the
conduct upon which the private suit is based.

(We attach

as Exhibit A to this Appendix proposed language to accomplish

this result.

The suggested amendment would also set a statute

of limitations of one year, measured from the latest judgment

of conviction for RICO or the civil predicate acts upon which
the civil action is based.

This proposal is identical to H.R.

2943, introduced on July 10, 1985, by Representative Boucher.)
Under this amendment, civil RICO could no longer be

used simply to raise the stakes in or federalize commercial
disputes.

The plaintiff would have to prove that:

(1)

the defendant violated the provisions
of RICO by engaging in conduct that
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962;
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(2)

the defendant has been convicted either
of a RICO violation or of one of the
predicate acts based on the conduct
upon which the plaintiff bases his
civil RICO claim;

(3)

the plaintiff has been injured in his
business or property by the defendant's
violation of Section 1962; and

(4)

the plaintiff has filed his treble-damage
suit within one year of the latest per
tinent convictions.

With this change in the law, civil RICO could only

be used against persons whom prosecutors have decided to charge

with crimes and who have been found guilty of criminal acts.
This amendment would restore the central role of public pro

secutors originally envisioned by Congress.

Before plaintiffs

could call upon the treble-damage remedy made available under

RICO specifically to deal with organized crime, there would

first have to be a determination by the public prosecutors and
juries that the defendant was actually engaged in criminal
activity.
The ABA RICO Task Force Report agrees that the

creation of some prior criminal conviction requirement "would
be preferable to the present statute and its intolerable

overbreadth."

ABA RICO Task Force Report at 238.

Neverthe

less, instead of this direct and precise solution, the ABA
Task Force offers as an alternative a package of ten different
substantive changes in the statute in order to achieve the

same basic result as the prior criminal conviction requirement
— returning civil RICO to its proper focus.
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That laundry

list of changes, however, is cumbersome.

It is likely to

raise complex problems in the course of drafting and implemen
tation.

In fact, the drafting issues were so unwieldy that

the Task Force did not even attempt to offer specific statutory

language to implement its proposals.
Furthermore, most changes in statutory language, no

matter how minor, raise issues of interpretation and implemen

tation unanticipated at the time of passage.

An approach

that requires ten major changes is certain to create many new

issues.

The prior criminal conviction requirement achieves

the same result with but one simple amendment.

It has already

been drafted and its impact has been subjected to intense

*

scrutiny and conjecture by its proponents and opponents alike.

As the following discussion demonstrates, despite that intense
scrutiny, no major problems that would arise from its implemen

tation have been identified.
The ABA RICO Task Force alternatively suggests that

if some version of a prior criminal conviction requirement

is adopted, the Congress should consider making treble damages

available only where there are prior criminal convictions,
but allow private plaintiffs to sue for actual damages even
where there have been no previous convictions.
Force Report at 238.

ABA RICO Task

Such a change would, of course, not

solve the underlying problem, which is the use of civil RICO

for unintended and abusive purposes.

to abuse civil RICO would remain.

Two major opportunities

First, plaintiffs would

still be able to increase the in terrorem effect of their
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suits — and hence their settlement value, whatever the merits

of the cases — because of the coercive effect of even an
unsubstantiated accusation of "racketeering."

Second, plain

tiffs would be able to "federalize" traditional state law tort
and contract claims by recasting them as RICO cases, and thus

accelerate the growth of cases on the federal court dockets

that rightfully belong in the state legal systems, if anywhere.

Thus, all civil RICO claims should be subject to a prior
conviction requirement.

D.

None Of The Criticisms Of A Prior Criminal
Conviction Requirement Is Substantial

Persons eager to preserve the potent weapon which
civil RICO has become in ordinary commercial litigation have

repeatedly thrown out a laundry list of so-called problems

associated with a prior-criminal-conviction requirement.
Through repetition — and undoubtedly because to date these

claims have generally gone unanswered — these assertions
have taken on more credence than they deserve, and we find

less jaundiced observers, such as the ABA RICO Task Force

and the five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court in Sedima,
repeating these criticisms.

In truth, if these so-called

problems are examined one by one, one discovers that there
is no real substantial impediments behind the rhetoric.14/

14/
14/ The proof, in part, is in the doing. We discussed
earlier cases in which plaintiffs brought civil RICO cases
against defendants who had first been convicted on criminal
charges. See pp. 16-17, supra. There is no indication in any
of these cases that the plaintiffs found insurmountable prob
lems or even substantial difficulties in bringing those law
suits .
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1.

"Gutting" the civil remedies

A criminal conviction precondition to private civil
RICO actions would not "gut" the remedies available to private

parties, as some critics of a prior-criminal-conviction

As our earlier discussion demonstrates,

requirement charge.

there already have been cases in which plaintiffs have used
civil RICO to go after defendants who had been first convicted

of criminal charges.

See pp. 16-17, supra.

type would continue.

Moreover, if there has been no criminal

Cases of this

prosecution and conviction, a potential plaintiff would still
have available all the other federal and state law remedies
that apply to commercial disputes and torts; he would not be*

left without a remedy.

2.

The "private attorney general" rationale

The ABA Task Force suggests that the criminal con

viction requirement may be "too restrictive" because it would
eliminate "what some courts have labelled the useful 'private

attorney general’ aspect of Civil RICO."

Report at 238.

ABA RICO Task Force

The Supreme Court majority in Sedima similarly

referred to Section 1964(c) as a "private attorney general
"provision []."

53 U.S.L.W. at 5038.

This view, however,

rests on the erroneous assumption that civil RICO was meant
to deputize private claimants and their lawyers to serve as

"private attorneys general."

The private damage remedy under

RICO, however, was not created in order to empower private

citizens to take on law enforcement responsibilities, and
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there is no good reason to view the statute today as serving
that end.
No one who has taken a hard look at the problem of
organized crime -- not the Kefauver Committee in the 1950s,
not the Katzbach Commission in the 1960s, not Senator McClel

lan’s Committee in the 1960s and 1970s -- has ever believed

that private civil suits could be an important weapon in the
war against organized crime.

Significantly, the Department

of Justice itself has never suggested that it believes that
private citizens should have the right to accuse other persons

of crimes, nor has the Justice Department indicated that pri

vate suits are necessary to supplement its efforts to attack
organized crime.
Indeed, it would be foolish to believe that a private

citizen would have the temerity to sue a real organized crime
figure for racketeering, unless the government has first prose

cuted and convicted him.

There is no indication that anyone in

Congress entertained that naive belief when RICO was passed in
1970.

The lesson of the last 15 years' experience with civil

RICO confirms the sensible assumption that criminal conviction

is, as a practical matter, a necessary precondition to private
RICO suits against the kind of criminal Congress had in its
sights.

In the few civil RICO cases that have been brought

against violent organized crime figures, private suits actually

have followed prosecution and conviction, and have not been a
substitute for criminal conviction.
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See pp. 16-17, supra.

Thus, the only impact from adopting a criminal conviction

requirement would be to filter out the suits that have nothing

to do with the war on organized crime.
Moreover, Assistant Attorney General Trott's testi
mony before this Committee in May 1985 shows that the Justice

Department has brought RICO prosecutions in at least as many
cases as civil litigants are using the statute, and the number

of federal criminal cases is growing.

Federal and state

prosecutors, of course, bring thousands of non-RICO prosecu
tions involving the predicate offenses listed in RICO.

It is

baseless to assert that the targets of the private civil RICO
cases that private lawyers have brought in the absence of

prior convictions would have been prosecuted if only federal
and state prosecutors had more resources.

The simple truth

is, as the Executive Director of the ABA RICO Task Force

acknowledged elsewhere, these private civil suits are brought
in cases that no responsible prosecutor would have treated as

criminal.

See pp. 17-18, supra.

3.

Possible effects on public prosecutors

The opponents of the prior-criminal-conviction
requirement assert that this requirement could influence the

way public prosecutors perform their duties.

They speculate:

(1)

Federal prosecutors could be subject to
undue pressures from private parties with
potential civil RICO claims to press RICOrelated prosecutions.

(2)

Prosecutors may be subject to accusations
that they were influenced in their decisions
to press RICO-related prosecutions because of
the impact on individuals' civil remedies.
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(3)

Prosecutors nay be willing to accept plea
bargains that are unrelated to the merits
of the case. The criminal conviction
requirement, it is suggested, could create
a powerful new weapon in the hands of the
prosecutor to force defendants to plead to
lesser, non-predicate-act offenses.
If
prosecutors accept pleas to non-predicate
act offenses, private litigants would lose
their opportunity for civil relief, or at
least lose the opportunity to sue certain
defendants.

The fact is that public prosecutors already are

subject to the entreaties of private parties whose interests
are at stake in criminal proceedings.

In the full range of

potential civil litigation, from murder and arson to securities

fraud and antitrust, there are private parties whose ability
to win civil damage suits would be vastly enhanced by a suc
The public prosecutor's duty,

cessful criminal prosecution.

however, is to weigh those interests in balance along with

other relevant factors in deciding where the public interest
lies.

There is simply no reason to presume that a RICO statute

subject to a prior-criminal-conviction requirement would create
pressures qualitatively different from those which already

exist, or that the prosecutors would no longer be able to dis
charge their duties fairly, or that the public perception of

the prosecutor's decision-making would be adversely affected.
Nor is there any basis to assume that a federal pros

ecutor will bargain away a good case against racketeers —
either on the predicate offenses or the RICO charge itself —
and thus foreclose an otherwise proper civil RICO case.

Many

of the predicate acts listed in the RICO statute do not have
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"lesser included offenses," and so it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to arrange a plea to a non-predicate offense
in an organized crime case.

Furthermore, plea bargaining in

the federal courts has never been as extensive as in the over

crowded and understaffed state court systems.

Federal prose

cutors simply do not bargain away good cases because of other
constraints, such as limited resources.

It is virtually

unthinkable that federal prosecutors, despite public and

congressional oversight, would irresponsibly agree to drop

real organized crime cases in plea bargaining.
The decision to enter a plea bargain in federal
court is governed principally by three general' considerations:

(1) the severity of the crime; (2) the record of the defendant;

and (3) the strength of the government's case.

The United

States Attorneys' Manual, which states the rules and guidelines
that govern federal prosecutors, sets out eleven factors that
the prosecutor must consider in "determining whether it would

be appropriate to enter into a plea agreement."

The factors

at the top of the list include the "defendant's willingness to
cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others," the

defendant's criminal record, the nature of the charges, the
defendant's "remorse or contrition," the "likelihood of obtain

ing a conviction at trial," and similar concerns.

Only at the

end of this exhaustive list does the manual even mention

consideration of prosecutorial and judicial resources.

See

U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual
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§ 9-27.420 (June 15, 1984).

Thus, the Department of Justice's

own standards will prevent prosecutors from allowing organized

crime figures to escape with pleas to minor crimes.
Finally, as a practical matter, it is doubtful that

fear of civil liability would be a major factor in a criminal

defendant's decision whether to enter a plea bargain.

More

over, if it did provide an additional incentive to get organ
ized crime figures to plead guilty and to cooperate with the

federal authorities, Congress should encourage that result,

not fear it.

The primary purpose of RICO has always been, and

should remain, to increase the weapons available to federal

prosecutors in fighting organized crime.

If the rare case

comes along in which the prosecutor concludes that he can use
the threat of a private civil suit to gain cooperation from
a racketeer, purely private financial interests should not

be allowed to frustrate the public interest in effective
criminal law enforcement.

4.

Possible effect on witness credibility

Another concern that has been raised is that a wit

ness's credibility would be subject to challenge at a criminal
trial if he stands to gain from the conviction of the defen

dant.

Here again, a criminal conviction requirement would

not qualitatively change the present situation.

Any witness

with an actual or potential civil claim against the defendant

has a financial and personal stake in the success of the crimi
nal prosecution; thus, the witness's credibility is already
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subject to challenge on that basis.

Moreover, under modern

notions of collateral estoppel, if the defendant is convicted

on the charges, the factual issues resolved against the
defendant by the verdict would in all likelihood be considered
settled against him in a civil suit.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).

See Parklane Hosiery Co.

Thus, under RICO as well as

under other statutes, the benefit accruing to a victim/witness

from a conviction in a parallel criminal proceeding already
provides a basis for attacking the witness’s credibility in
the criminal trial.

Indeed, if a criminal conviction is not a precondi

tion to civil suit, the witness may have a civil suit pending.

concurrently with his testimony in a criminal case.

In the

jury's eyes, this direct and specific interest in obtaining a

conviction may cast more doubt on the witness's credibility

than would the mere possibility that the witness might file a

civil suit if the defendant is convicted.

Thus, by postponing

the ability to file a civil RICO suit, Congress could actually
minimize questions about the complaining witness's credibility
at the criminal trial and thereby enhance the statute's
primary purpose, the prosecution and conviction of organized

crime figures.
5.

Delay in bringing the civil RICO suit

Another category of issues raised about the prior-

criminal-conviction requirement involves the timing of civil
suits.

The comments generally take the following form:
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(1)

Uncertainty would exist as to when the
statute of limitations begins to run
on the RICO claim, and whether the
civil plaintiff must wait until crimi
nal appeals are exhausted.

(2)

It is unclear what effect reversals or
pleas of nolo contendere would have on
civil RICO claims.

(3)

Private parties would be forced to
divide causes of action and bring two
separate suits, because they have to
go forward with their non-RICO claims
before the statute of limitations runs
out.

(4)

Because of the long interval that can
pass between the occurrence of a crime
and a conviction, the private plain
tiff's ability to pursue a civil remedy
successfully could be prejudiced by (a)
the staleness of evidence and (b) the
defendant's dissipation or concealment
of assets.

None of these worries is substantial.

There is no

difficulty in establishing the beginning of the limitations
period.

A claim does not accrue for purposes of a statute of

limitations until all the elements of the plaintiff's cause of

action exist.

See, e.g., Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 722

F.2d 845, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 327

(1984).

If a prior criminal conviction constituted a necessary

element of a civil RICO claims, the statute of limitations would

not begin to run until the government secured the pertinent

conviction.

In any event, the amendment can include language

that specifically links the limitations period to the date of
the latest pertinent judgment of conviction, as does H.R. 2943.

The other issues can be handled equally easily under
well-established principles of judicial procedure.
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By analogy

to principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, which
take effect as soon as the trial court enters its judgment, the
civil RICO suit could commence as soon as a judgment of convic

tion is entered and need not wait until appeals have run their
course.

If one of the predicate convictions is reversed on

appeal and remanded for a new trial, the civil action could be
stayed during the proceedings on remand, or could be dismissed

without prejudice to refiling at a later date if the defendant
is re-convicted.
If in the criminal proceeding the defendant pleads

nolo contendere or enters the kind of "no contest" plea the
Supreme Court approved in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1970), the judgment in either case would lay the founda

tion for a civil RICO complaint.

The law treats either of

those pleas as a confession of guilt, and the court renders

a judgment of conviction.

See id. at 35-37; Lott v. United

States, 367 U.S. 421, 426-27 (1961).

Once a conviction is

entered, the private plaintiff could proceed accordingly with
a RICO suit.

Nor is there any problem created because certain
related causes of action might accrue before the civil RICO

claim accrues.

The premise underlying this concern is that

the civil RICO remedy duplicates other existing federal or
state remedies that the plaintiff may pursue.

Since the

purpose of creating the civil RICO remedy was to authorize

redress for people who otherwise have no legal rights under
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other statutes and legal theories, this is an ironic objection.

In cases of that sort, a potential RICO claim should be viewed

as merely cumulative.

The plaintiff has no legitimate griev

ance if he must proceed with other remedies that the law

already makes available to him.
In any event, if a plaintiff has both a potential
RICO claim and a ripe claim under another legal theory, normal
rules of procedure would govern.

non-RICO claim on a timely basis.

The plaintiff may bring his

If he wishes to defer

further proceedings in that suit until any criminal charges
against the defendant are resolved, he may seek to stay his
civil suit until the RICO claim ripens.. If he proceeds with

the non-RICO claim, the established principles of res judicata

and collateral estoppel would govern the impact of the outcome

of that first action on any later RICO action.

See 1B J. Moore

J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice 11 0.441-0.448
(2d ed. 1984).

If he loses his non-RICO case claim after a

fair opportunity to establish it, he has little reason to com

plain that this decision would bar an overlapping RICO-related

claim based on the same conduct.

If, by contrast, the plaintiff wins a damage award
in his non-RICO suit based on the predicate acts, and then

brings a proper RICO case, the damage awards may not completely

overlap.

His RICO claim may relate to a distinct type of

injury and, in any event, would be trebled.

To the degree

that there is duplication, the second court would reduce the
later award under established legal principles preventing
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duplicative awards for the same injury.

See, e.g., American

Mail Line, Ltd. v. Weaver, 408 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir. 1969).
The concerns expressed about the staleness of evi

dence also suffer from similar underlying defects.
of stale evidence would seldom arise.

A problem

As previously discussed,

under modern notions of offensive collateral estoppel, the
criminal conviction would probably establish the defendant's

civil liability in the ensuing civil RICO suit, without even
the need for further evidence.

Moreover, all of the evidence

collected through the government's resources and presented at

the criminal trial would be available to the civil plaintiff.

In. any event, the plaintiff with a civil RICO claim
may have to depend, for practical purposes, on a prior criminal
proceeding.

RICO defines a "pattern of racketeering," which

even the civil plaintiff must allege and prove, as at least
the commission of two predicate offenses within a ten-year

span.

Thus, no one may bring a civil RICO claim until the

defendant has committed at least a second predicate offense,
at which point the first offense may well be quite dated.

In the absence of a prior criminal prosecution, a private

party could have substantial difficulty proving the earlier
predicate offense, especially if it involved an unrelated
transaction, as it should.

Thus, not only is the "lag time"

in government prosecutions unlikely to undermine a plaintiff's

ability to prove a proper civil RICO case, prior prosecution
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may well be a necessary component of a successful private
civil case.15/
The prospect of dissipation of assets is also illu

sory.

Under the 1984 amendments to RICO, Congress gave the

government expanded powers to bring forfeiture proceedings

in conjunction with criminal charges under RICO and to obtain

preliminary relief in the form of seizure of assets even prior
to indictment.

See Sec. 302, P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040-44

(amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963).

The government, therefore, has

both the power and the incentive to prevent the defendant from

secreting his assets.

Moreover, under the 1984 amendments,

the Attorney General is empowered to use the funds actually
obtained through criminal forfeiture to "restore forfeited

15/It is true that some civil RICO plaintiffs have manu
factured a "pattern" out of essentially simultaneous events,
principally because separate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud,
or securities fraud can be pleaded for each instance in which
the mail or telephone is used or each time a share is sold.
See pp. 5-6, supra. But these are instances in which RICO is
being abused to apply only to a single episode or transaction.
In cases actually involving organized crime, the predi
cate acts will be more widely separated in time. The Justice
Department recognizes that this separation in time is a char
acteristic of a proper RICO case; under its RICO guidelines,
the Department prohibits use of RICO to challenge conduct
that is simply part of a single episode or transaction. U.S.
Department of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual, ¶ 9110.340 (March 9, 1984); see pp. 48-49, supra. As the Depart
ment explicitly states in explaining this limitation, "the
purpose of this guideline is to prevent a pattern of racketeer
ing activity being charged which lacks the attributes which
Congress had in mind but which is literally within the language
of the statute." Id. at ¶ 9-110.341; see also Sedima, 53
U.S.L.W. at 5038 n.14, 5039 (suggesting the statutory require
ment of proof of a "pattern" demands something more than just
proof of two predicate acts within ten years).
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property to victims” of a RICO violation or "take any other

action to protect the rights of innocent persons” and "award
compensation to persons providing information resulting in a
forfeiture . . . .”

18 U.S.C. § 1963(h)(1) and (3).

Thus,

prior criminal proceedings actually may enhance the ability of

civil plaintiffs to secure compensation.
Nor should one lose sight of the fact that persons

with claims for relief arising from the predicate acts may
press those claims immediately.

If they have damage claims for

securities fraud or commercial fraud, for example, they would
not be inhibited from bringing those claims simply because

there is a separate limitation designed solely to assure that"
civil RICO claims deal only with actual criminal conduct.
Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides ample

remedies to the private plaintiff to assure that the defendant
preserves enough assets to satisfy a potential judgment.

6.

Inability to reach some of the culprits

Finally, questions have been raised about whether it

is sound to prevent private plaintiffs from bringing civil RICO
suits against actual criminal offenders who, for some reason
not related to their culpability, are not convicted.

We have already touched on one of these situations,
where federal prosecutors are able to get one of the suspects

to cooperate by allowing him to plea bargain to a non-predicate
offense or even by immunizing him from all criminal liability.

See, p. 60, supra.

Traditionally, prosecutors have had great
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difficulty getting such cooperation from organized crime

figures, because of the enormous risks faced by the member of
organized crime who aids the government.

The Department of

Justice and Congress, therefore, should embrace, not reject,

the opportunity to create a new incentive to get persons to
give evidence against organized crime.

Moreover, the private

party in these hypothetical situations will still have other
potential defendants to sue — those against whom the cooperat
ing culprit testifies.

It is also reasonable to assume that

it will be the minor figures who are given the opportunity to
plea bargain; the major targets, who are likely to have greater

assets, will remain exposed to private civil RICO claims*.
The other points voiced by opponents fall equally
short.

They are:
(1)

If the indictment is dismissed for rea
sons unrelated to the merits, the civil
plaintiff will never be able to sue.

(2)

Without changes in the legal concept
of derivative liability, if individual
principals are convicted of predicate
acts, but the organization holding the
assets is not, the civil plaintiff will
not be able to reach the assets neces
sary for compensation.

(3)

If the criminal defendant remains a
fugitive from justice, the criminal
case will remain unresolved and the
private plaintiff will go uncompensated
even though the fugitive has assets in
this country against which a civil award
could be collected.

In fact, a fatal dismissal of an indictment for

reasons unrelated to the merits occurs only in the rarest of
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cases.

In virtually all instances in which the indictment

is dismissed on technical grounds, the government can simply
reindict. Federal law specifically provides for an extension

of all statutes of limitations in order to guarantee federal

prosecutors just such an opportunity to reindict.

See 18

U.S.C. §§ 3288-89.
Opponents of the criminal conviction requirement
also conjure up the specter of a serious criminal case that
the government cannot successfully prosecute after a court

suppresses critical evidence because it was seized in viola

This is a far-fetched fear.

tion of the Fourth Amendment.

Even before United States v. Leon,

U.S.

82 L.Ed.2d

677 (1984), in which the Supreme Court created a substantial
exception to the "exclusionary rule" for cases in which the

police rely in good faith on a search warrant, the exclusionary
rule actually had led to suppression of evidence in a miniscule

proportion of all criminal cases.

The empirical studies cited

by the Supreme Court in the Leon case found that the exclu

sionary rule affected the prosecution in the cases of only
about 1% of the persons arrested for felonies.

688 n.6.

82 L.Ed.2d at

Since these figures relate to all persons arrested,

the percentage of arrestees who were actually guilty but

escaped conviction because of the suppression of evidence

must have been even smaller.
Even those figures overstate the effect of the exclu

sionary rule in organized crime cases, since most challenged
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searches and seizures involve street crimes investigated by

local police, not carefully planned and supervised federal
investigations of organized crime.

It will be the careful

investigations of organized crime activities, where search

warrants are typically used, that will particularly benefit

from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Leon to eliminate
the exclusion when investigators rely on warrants.

Furthermore, even when the exclusionary rule applies,
its scope is extremely limited.

The illegally seized evidence

may be used against all defendants except the particular person
whose Fourth Amendment rights were actually violated.

v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973).

Brown

Thus, the case against

all co-conspirators and other defendants accused of partici

pating in the racketeering enterprise would be unaffected.

At

bottom, then, only in the rarest of cases, if ever, would the

Fourth Amendment block conviction on RICO-related charges and
deprive an otherwise deserving plaintiff of the opportunity to

pursue a civil RICO recovery.
Similarly insubstantial is the speculation that a

conviction requirement could insulate from recovery the assets

that a convicted racketeer has placed within some unconvicted
enterprise.

It is quite unlikely that an organized crime

figure will place his assets in a business organization that
is outside of his personal control.

Rather, the enterprise

will be operated in a form — such as a partnership or a joint
venture — where the assets can be reached through a suit
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against ths individual.

Even if the criminal resorts to a

corporate form, the assets will still be reachable for at

least one of two reasons.

The criminal principal will own

or control the stock of the corporation, in which case that
stock, representing the value of the assets, can be reached.
If the criminal does not own the enterprise outright, then

he will undoubtedly be milking it or otherwise misusing the
corporate form in a manner that will allow the court to "pierce

the corporate veil," thus permitting the civil plaintiff to
reach the assets at issue.

Corporate Law Veil:

See generally Note, Piercing the

The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal

Common Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev., 853 (1982).

In sum, no criminal

is simply going to give away his ill-gotten gains.

As long as

the assets remain his, the law provides the necessary tools to

break through any formal barriers.

Thus, the problem suppos

edly posed by the conviction of the "principals" but not the

"organization" is no problem at all.
Similarly, the defendant's fugitive status will
rarely, if ever, stand in the way of a civil RICO claim.

There are few places left in the world for an indicted crim
inal to hide.

According to the Office of the Legal Adviser

at the Department of State, the United States currently has

criminal extradition treaties with over one hundred nations,
including all of the countries in which a wealthy racketeer

might want to take refuge.

Moreover, Congress cannot realis

tically assume that all members of a criminal enterprise will
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successfully flee the United States and in that way escape
conviction.

Only in that extraordinarily unlikely event would

a plaintiff be left with no target for a civil RICO suit.
Thus, few if any proper civil RICO plaintiffs will be left

without any civil recourse against any racketeer.

VI.

CONCLUSION
The need for reform is clear.

reform is clear.

The nature of the

And the responsibility for reform is clear.

Congress should amend the civil provisions of RICO to focus
the private remedy on its original purpose of aiding the war
against organized crime, while curing its capacity to bludgeon
innocent business people.

The easiest and best method to accomplish this
purpose is to amend 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) to create a prior

criminal-conviction requirement in private civil RICO actions.

This type of amendment will give rise to the fewest complica
tions.

None of the arguments against this requirement stands

up under analysis.

The proper civil RICO plaintiff — the

victim who has been damaged by actual criminal activity
committed by a repeat criminal offender — will have a full

and effective remedy.

The only losers will be those persons

who should have no legitimate claim to invoke this special

statute at all.

72

Amend subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. S 1964 ("Civil
remedies") to read as follows (new natter under
scored, deleted natter bracketed):

*
"(c)

*

*

Any person injured in his business or

property by reason of conduct in [a] violation of
section 1962 of this chapter nay sue [therefor)
any person who engaged in that conduct and, with
respect to such conduct, was convicted of racket
eering activity or a violation of section 1962 in

any appropriate United States district court, and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable

attorney’s fee.

A civil action under this sub

section may not be commenced against a defendant
later than one year after the entry of the latest

judgment of conviction against the defendant for
racketeering activity or a violation of section

1962 with respect to the conduct out of which

such action arises."

*

*

*

EXPLANATION
This amendment would limit the abuse of RICO's

private, civil treble-damage mechanism under which claimants
in many types of commercial disputes have been able to gain

unwarranted leverage for their positions by branding their
adversaries "racketeers."

The amendment would implement

Congress' judgment that the use of RICO’s powerful weapons

against "organized crime" should rest on the expertise and
discretion of public prosecutors.

The amendment would

achieve those objectives by making it clear that the civil

treble-damage provision is to be used only against persons
whom prosecutors have decided to charge and whom juries
have decided to convict of criminal violations of RICO or

of the underlying "predicate" offenses.
Under this amendment the civil remedy would dovetail

with the careful screening performed by the Department of
Justice in applying its guidelines to distinguish cases that

are properly subject to. the special RICO provisions from those
that are not.

It also would rely on determinations by federal

and local prosecutors and juries that the defendants were actu

ally engaged in criminal activity.

Accordingly, the special

civil treble-damage provisions of RICO would be directed only

at those persons who may fairly be viewed as engaged in the
Ordinary commercial disputes

business of "organized crime.”

and tort claims would be left exclusively to the other federal

or state remedies that appropriately apply to them.
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